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(NEW YORK, W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, 2015)
Virág Ilyés1
If I had to summarize my thoughts about this book in a few words, I would 
say that it is not a typical one – but take this as a compliment. Due to its 
suggestive name, “The Making of Behavioral Economics”, we might assume 
that we would be facing a well written and well-structured handbook about 
the discipline of behavioral economics. But after a few chapters and the first 
personal recollections, we have to realize that we had been fooled a little: this 
book is definitely not a handbook, but rather a good memoir. And what is more 
surprising at first is that it is a memoir about Richard A. Thaler’s academic 
career and also the discipline of behavioral economics. The main focus of the 
book is to introduce the most important conceptions and findings of behavioral 
economics, but this is done from Thaler’s perspective. We can follow his career 
advancement, from the point he started his PhD in economics to present days. 
We see how his early ideas – which were not taken seriously at the beginning – 
developed over time, and started to invade the traditional “economic” view of 
the world. We see through Thaler’s eyes how a new discipline started to emerge 
– and also, how Thaler contributed to creating it –, and we can read about the 
milestones that were achieved by its early representatives.
ECONS AND HUMANS
Homo Economicus, or “Econs” are described in the book as mythical creatures 
which are rarely or never seen by anybody, but are thought to be real. Traditional 
economic science is built upon ideas about these beings: thoughts about how 
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they make their choices serve as the basis for core economic theory and for 
formal economic models. Econs make choices by optimizing: they choose the 
best possible choice of action based on the information that is available, their 
preferences, and their calculations of costs and benefits. They are rational, act 
in their own self-interest, and are perfect calculators. Thus, social behavior (in 
the most general sense) – what we see, perceive and examine in society – is an 
aggregation of the behavior of these actors. 
This picture may appear to be coherent, but we can sense that something is not 
right: is it realistic to depict humans as Econs? To answer this question, Thaler 
starts his book with an old story from the time he was at the beginning of his 
teaching career. When delivering his microeconomics course, he composed his 
exams with one aim in mind: to distinguish between those students who had 
really mastered the course material, a medium-level group who understood the 
basics, and those who were weakest. In order to do this, he added a few difficult 
tasks to the exam which could be solved only by those who really understood 
what they had learnt. This strategy yielded the expected results: there was a 
wide dispersion of scores – the average result was 72/100, meaning that the 
average grade was B or B+, because the school graded on a curve. Although 
these grades were not awful, students were mad because of the low average. To 
manage this situation (and to preserve his original idea about maintaining the 
challenging nature of the exam), Thaler increased the maximum total number of 
points from 100 to 137. This strange step was actually successful: the students’ 
average performance did not change (they still got approximately 70% of all 
questions right), but the average score moved up from 72 to 96 – and students 
were happy. However, supposing that these students were Econs, we would have 
to say that they were somehow misbehaving – for an Econ, the average score 
would not be important if the average grade was approximately the same. So 
from a traditional economic perspective, misbehavior such as this would be 
considered a “supposedly irrelevant factor” (SIF), while as the story illustrates, 
it actually matters. 
In real life, people tend to act differently from the hypothetical version of 
them: we are not rational optimization machines, we have not got as much self-
control as Gandhi, and unlike Econs, our choices can be biased. Considering 
this, behavioral economics is a good attempt to smuggle some reality back into 
the world of Econs and make them a little bit more Human.
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PREDECESSORS
Naturally, the contrast between Econs and Humans was an issue for debate 
long before the birth of behavioral economics: in the discipline of economics 
there is a long tradition of denying the rationalist simplifications of the marginal 
utility approach – one may refer here to the institutionalist tradition or to 
Thorstein Veblen, Karl Polanyi and Douglass North for example. Contemporary 
economic sociology also formulated a more realistic approach to the theory of 
economic behavior with the conception of embeddedness. 
In his book, Thaler introduces a few powerful ideas that inspired his work. 
Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality is derived from the observation 
that Humans cannot optimize in the way that is claimed in rational choice theory. 
Sometimes they fail because problems are too complex, sometimes because of 
cognitive limitations, and sometimes due to lack of time. Individual rationality 
is somehow bounded by these factors, so the description of humans as Econs 
can be misleading. Another important idea is prospect theory. Traditionally, 
people’s utility function was constructed using wealth – this concept suggests 
that individual utility/happiness increases as people get wealthier, but at a 
decreasing rate. This latter fact creates what is called risk aversion in the 
economic jargon: the fact that individuals generally prefer certainty – e.g. would 
prefer to receive a fixed payment (for example, 40$) – than to take a risk – e.g. 
to make a binary gamble between getting 0$ or 100$. Kahneman and Tversky 
provided an alternative to this theory: the scholars propose that individuals derive 
utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point, rather than wealth, per 
se. Also, the authors note that individuals are more sensitive to losses than gains 
– so-called loss aversion – and experience diminishing sensitivity to changes 
further away from the status quo (the concept of just-noticeable differences). 
They also tend to overweight low probabilities and underweight high ones.
SUPPOSEDLY IRRELEVANT FACTORS
At the beginning of his career, Thaler started to collect examples of situations 
Humans departed from the previously described, ideal or rational behavior; i.e., 
stories about people “misbehaving”. At first, this took the form of a long list 
of simple deviations that could have been swept under the rug by rationalists. 
But later on, it became obvious that these supposedly irrelevant deviations are 
in fact critical and systematically embedded elements of economic decision-
making. All the SIF’s covered in the book come with at least one good story.
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LOSS AVERSION AND THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT
Richard Rosett was a professor of economics who loved wines and had a few 
bottles that he had purchased long ago for a moderate price (10$), but which rose 
in value to more than 100$. A merchant was willing to buy a few of his bottles at 
their actual value, so Rosett had two basic options: drink them, or sell them. The 
interesting thing is that he did not sell any of his bottles, but rather drank from 
them occasionally, despite having the strong conviction that he would never buy 
a bottle of wine for 100$. The two latter statements somehow contradict each 
other. The fact that Rosett preferred to drink the bottles to selling them means 
that he valued the “wine experience” at more than 100$. But if so, why did he 
say he would never buy a bottle at that price? Rosett was willing to pay much 
less for acquiring a bottle – the out-of-pocket cost of buying a new bottle –, 
than he would require as compensation to sell one – the opportunity cost of not 
drinking the bottles. So his willingness to pay and willingness to accept differed 
significantly – which is irrational from the perspective of traditional economic 
theory. Rosett did not behave like an Econ. How can we explain this?
Thaler’s argument is based upon prospect theory and its notion that people are 
loss-averse. Giving up something (selling a bottle for 100$) can be understood as 
a loss, and because losses hurt twice as much as gains, we value our belongings 
more highly when we give them up compared to when we acquire them. This is 
what Thaler calls the endowment effect: individuals tend to view out-of-pocket 
costs as losses and weight them more heavily than opportunity costs which are 
considered foregone gains, and are thus weighted less heavily.
SUNK COSTS
In the world of Econs, sunk costs are ignored. Consider the simple situation 
that you have bought two tickets for a basketball game. From a rationalist 
perspective, the purchase – the fact that you have spent money – should not 
affect whether you go to the match. However, in the world of Humans this is 
not the case. If we get two tickets from an acquaintance but for some reason we 
cannot make it to the match we will probably stay home without remorse, but if 
we have paid for them ourselves we will feel the urge to go – otherwise we get 
“nothing for our money”, we have made a loss. And what people actually try to 
do is avoid loss.
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MENTAL ACCOUNTING
Consider typical Econs. They have clear and stable preferences; they buy 
exactly what they actually need. From a purchase they obtain acquisition utility 
(the consumer surplus that is obtained with an object that is acquired if we 
subtract the cost of getting it) equivalent to their valuation of the object. For a 
typical Econ, this is the end of the story. But what about Humans? In the world 
of Humans besides optimal transactions there are also “good deals” which can 
create acquisition and transactional utility. The latter refers to the difference 
between the price that was paid for an object and the price one would normally 
expect to pay for it. A good deal refers to an exchange involving abundant 
transaction utility which can make possible purchases that would not occur in 
the world of Econs.
In the fictional world of Econs it is also irrational to create mental 
buckets (“money jars”) for different causes (food, entertainment etc.), 
because individuals simply buy what they need. However, for Humans 
(and for different organizations as well) “bucketing” is a viable strategy 
for organizing and evaluating economic activity and overcoming cognitive 
limitations. Mental bucketing can help regulate what we buy, and in 
special situations can change our general behavioral patterns as well. For 
example, in the case of recently won money people tend to gamble more 
(i.e., generally risk-averse people become risk-seeking). Newly earned 
money basically gets placed into a new “bucket” in the individual’s mind 
that is considered both owned and not owned. This is called the “house 
money effect”. We tend to be less risk averse with money and budgets that 
are in less established buckets.
The final important notion is “narrow framing”. The idea is basically the 
following: when we make our decisions we sometimes see certain events and 
payments, etc. as separate things, but sometimes intertwined. A good example 
involves the decisions of New York taxi drivers about how they set their – 
flexible – working schedules. Assuming market rationality we might believe 
that when demand is high, there should be more taxi drivers on the streets, 
working longer hours. What Thaler actually found was the opposite: taxi 
drivers tend to work more on quiet days. How can this be? Based on interviews 
it was found that the main reason is that cab drivers have decided on a daily 
target income that corresponds to how much they want to earn per month – a 
reference point. By consistently applying this rule, however, they fall into the 
trap of thinking narrowly about earnings (i.e., hitting a daily target), which 
can mean that they work less on busy days and spend much more time on the 
roads on low-trip days.
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OTHER SIFS IN BRIEF
Thaler also shows how concerns about fairness affect the behavior of 
individuals in consumer and labor markets, with important implications for 
optimal firm behavior. He demonstrates the potential effect of “defaults” (for 
example, in the case of organ donations or savings) and deals with the effect of 
social norms. He also shows how SIFs can actually increase the common good 
– for example, how the wording of a simple first warning letter can affect the 
number of people who pay their tax debts.
A LIST OF EXCUSES
Naturally, besides the behavioral concepts described in stories and anecdotes 
Thaler provides references to good quality papers supported by experiments, 
and evidence from large-scale datasets. Although there has long been significant 
resistance from rationalists against these ideas, there are a few arguments that 
they still employ. The most popular argument in defense of traditional economic 
theory is that although its assumptions about economic agents sometimes seem 
unrealistic, predictions based on them are often somehow correct. This means 
that although people individually misbehave, it is not wrong to use models that 
suppose they do not. However, based on Thaler’s examples it seems plausible 
that this is not exactly true; the results of formal models can actually be 
misleading. Another argument is that people misbehave if the stakes are low, but 
when the stakes are high they will get it right. Moreover, in the real world people 
are capable of learning. These latter two ideas are somehow contradictory: 
individuals frequently meet with situations in which the stakes are low, but they 
encounter relatively few high-stakes situations in their lives, so they have no 
time to learn. The final claim is based on Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of the 
invisible hand, which suggests that people behave differently when the market 
is involved. In response to this, Thaler shows that the two basic components of 
the market efficiency hypothesis (“no free lunch”, and “the price is right”) are 
questionable.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
For a long time, traditional economic thinking has been considered adequate: 
it represented the best possible models of the world and people’s behavior. 
But, as time passed, it became outdated – many anomalies occur that are 
unexplainable using this paradigm, and have been swept under the rug. 
When early representatives of behavioral economics started to discover these 
phenomena traditional economists did not take their ideas seriously. When 
stronger evidence was introduced they resisted and employed customized 
excuses. Despite the fact that the new results modelled human behavior more 
accurately, traditional scholars refused to incorporate this knowledge into the 
toolbox of economic theory. From the perspective of Econs, this is completely 
irrational. Why wouldn’t we want to understand individual behavior better if the 
primary goal is to do this? It looks like, in the end, we live in a world of Humans. 
The most important takeaway from this book is that the main goal of 
behavioral economics is not to completely change how modern economics is 
understood, nor to destroy traditional economic way of thinking. Its main aim is 
to bring economic theory and the real world closer, to promote the idea that we 
should use hypothetical agents who are more like Humans than Econs. I believe 
that this book was not originally written for economists but for the public. It 
will be interesting for those who have never learnt about the discipline but are 
interested in knowing more about the world around us and those who live in it: 
for social scientists, I think it is perfect reading material. The book introduces 
the discipline of behavioral economics, shows the relevance of the field through 
various examples and explains the most important debates. Although these goals 
are achieved, the book’s perspective is subjective, somewhat unconventional. 
Accordingly, the book lacks the clear and logical structure typically found in 
handbooks – but this is understandable, due to the fact that the book is not only 
about behavioral economics but about Thaler’s life as well. Ideas are introduced 
in a very enjoyable way, while the presentation of papers behind the concepts 
is not overly detailed – a full description of methodology, research setting and 
formal models is usually partly lacking –, but those who are interested in digging 
a little deeper will find all the relevant references at the end of the book. In my 
opinion, this is a thought-provoking book that also has a heart. 
In the first chapter, Thaler makes an important recommendation: “My only 
advice for reading the book is stop reading when it is no longer fun. To do 
otherwise, well, that would be just misbehaving”. Fortunately, I did not have to 
misbehave.

